The tweets involved in the scam hack claimed that the sender, in charity, would repay any user double the value of any bitcoin they sent to given wallets, often as part of a COVID-19 relief effort. The "@6" Twitter had belonged to Adrian Lamo, and the user maintaining the account on behalf of Lamo's family reported that the group that performed the hack were able to bypass numerous security factors they had set up on the account, including two-factor authentication, further indicating that the administrative tools had been used to bypass the account security. To bypass two-factor authentication, attackers entered stolen credentials into the real Twitter VPN portal, and "within seconds of the employees entering their info into the fake one", asked victims for the two-factor authentication code. Twitter had been able to further confirm by July 30 that the method used was what they called a "phone spear phishing attack": they initially used social engineering to breach the credentials of lower-level Twitter employees who did not have access to the admin tools, and then using those employee accounts, engaged in additional social engineering attacks to get the credentials to the admin tools from employees who did have authorization for their use. There is a chance that if you set your fee too low your transaction will get stuck and might take a long time to confirm. These hackers told Vice that they had paid insiders at Twitter to get access to the administrative tool to be able to pull this off. Bloomberg News, after investigation with former and current Twitter employees, reported that as many as 1500 Twitter employees and partners had access to the admin tools that would allow for the ability to reset accounts as had been done during the incident. In addition to taking further steps to lock down the verified accounts affected, Twitter said they have also begun an internal investigation and have limited employee access to their system administrative tools as they evaluate the situation, as well as if any additional data was compromised by the malicious users. Twitter has not confirmed which accounts were restricted, but many users with accounts Twitter had marked as "verified" confirmed that they were unable to tweet. Users in India cannot convert rupees into cryptocurrency, but can trade between different cryptocurrencies. During this process, you may be asked to select which cryptocurrencies you want to manage on the device. To own bitcoin, you must create a bitcoin wallet on your computer, phone or on an external hardware device. To safeguard this wallet you must print or otherwise record the Bitcoin Cash (BCH) address and private key. From this perspective, personal crypto transactions seem to marry the benefits of cash with the convenience of an electronic payment, but without either the physical constraints of the former or the risk controls imposed on the latter. Vice's and TechCrunch's sources were corroborated by The New York Times, who spoke to similar persons involved with the events, and from other security researchers who had been given similar screens, and tweets of these screens had been made, but Twitter removed these since they revealed personal details of the compromised accounts. The New York Times further affirmed that the vector of the attack was related to most of the company remote working during the COVID-19 pandemic. After choosing victims for the next stage, attackers contacted Twitter employees, most who were remote working due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and, using the information from LinkedIn and other public sources, pretended to be Twitter personnel. The OGUsers members were able to gain access to the Twitter employees' Slack communications channel where information and authorization processes on accessing the company's servers while remote working had been pinned. Former Twitter employees had told Bloomberg that even as late as 2017 and 2018, those with access would make a game of using these tools to track famous celebrities though the amount of data visible through the tools alone was limited to elements like IP address and geolocation information. Still, picking a target let us do some basic calculations even if it's a little arbitrary. According to TechCrunch's source, this member "Kirk" had reportedly gained access to the Twitter administrative tool likely through a compromised employee account, and after initially offering to take over any account on request, switched strategies to target cryptocurrency accounts starting with Binance and then higher-profile ones. Twitter and other media sources confirmed that the perpetrators had gained access to Twitter's administrative tools so that they could alter the accounts themselves and post the tweets directly. Then attackers obtained these employees' cell phone numbers and other private contact information via paid tools LinkedIn makes available to job recruiters. Security researcher Brian Krebs corroborated with TechCrunch's source and with information obtained by Reuters that the scam appeared to have originated in the "OGUsers" group. They appeared to have used social engineering to gain access to the tools via Twitter employees. crypto address